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This paper explores and compares the socio-spatial effects of Islamophobia in Paris 
and London. Our research focuses on different spaces and types of discrimination 
against Muslims or people who are perceived to be Muslim in Paris and London 
using primarily quantitative data. A quantitative analysis of the geographical 
spaces of Islamophobia is presented, while highlighting the ways in which anti-
Muslim discrimination is gendered, racialized, classed and aged. We identify the 
different contexts in which Islamophobia takes place in each city. This spatial 
analysis highlights not only particular places such as public areas, transport 
networks or public institutions, but it also describes specific logics of spatial 
organisation showing the importance of the centre and the suburbs, transport axes 
and pockets of segregation. Using an intersectional approach, we also demonstrate 
that Islamophobic discrimination is often shaped simultaneously by other types of 
exclusions associated with gender, race, class and age. We found that victims were 
more likely to be young women who wear a headscarf with the perpetrators more 
likely to be men in the UK and both men and women in France.  
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Introduction 
The increase in the number of anti-Muslim acts in many western European 
countries is causing serious concern (EUMC, 2006; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; 
CNCDH, 2014; CCIF, 2014; Tell MAMA, 2016). This increase is related to recent 
terrorist attacks and political debates about the visibility of Muslim populations and their 
apparent difficulties with ‘integrating’ into European society. In predominantly non-
Muslim countries and especially in France and United Kingdom (UK), these debates are 
not new; they have been present for the last ten years or so and have led to the 
implementation, notably in France, of several laws1 prohibiting the visibility of religious 
symbols in public spaces. It is essential to be able to criticize religious and cultural 
practices but this ‘political enterprise’ (Lorcerie, 2005) has ultimately led to worrying 
processes of marginalisation, such as for example the increasing stigmatisation of Muslim 
populations. This stigmatisation has fostered the emergence of anti-Muslim sentiment 
and numerous acts of discrimination or violence that have a direct impact on the everyday 
lives of Muslim families and those who are perceived to be Muslim. We contend that the 
socio-spatial effects of Islamophobia shed light on the complexities of Islamophobia and 
how best to respond to such incidents. Indeed, by knowing that Islamophobic 
                                                 
1 In France, there are two main laws: the law of the 15th March 2004 (impulsed by the hijab) 
prohibiting the wearing of ostensible religious signs in public schools and the law of the 10th 
October 2010 (impulsed by the niqab) prohibiting the concealment of the face in public space. 
These laws have been adopted in the name of secularism, gender equality, and empowerment 
of women. In general, the 2004 French law was perceived as an attack against the individual 
freedom of the Muslim women and their dignity, and was characterized as racist and sexist 
(Hancock, 2009). 
discriminations happen in specific places, target specific people, and function in a specific 
way, then we can understand that we need a specific policy to adequately address the 
problem of Islamophobia.  
Research about Islamophobia has increased since the late 1990s (Halliday, 1999; 
Saeed, 2007; Allen, 2010; Geisser, 2010; Hajjat and Mohamed, 2013; Meer, 2013), yet 
few studies focus on the geographical dimensions. Islamophobia has been primarily 
explored by sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists. Social and cultural 
geographers, however, are key actors in the study of religious discrimination. Important 
research on Muslim exclusion and Islamophobia (Dwyer, 1999; Dunn, 2005; Mansson 
McGinty et al., 2012; Hancock, 2015; Hopkins et al., 2017) focuses on spatial justice, 
racism, identity and feminist geography. Our intention in this paper is to question how 
Islamophobia is read spatially, and how space makes a geographical approach essential 
in enabling us to understand experiences of Islamophobia. Islamophobia targets people 
because of perceptions about their affiliation to the Islamic faith, and in this research 
project, we define Islamophobia as anti-Muslim hate crimes targeting Muslim or 
presumed Muslim populations and institutions. A hate crime is motivated by 
discrimination or prejudice based on who you are or what you look like (examples of hate 
crime include verbal abuse, harassment, physical assault, and so on). The first goal of our 
paper is to present a comparative case-study of spatialized Islamophobia in Paris and 
London to social and cultural geographical literature on Muslim exclusion and 
Islamophobia.  
This paper explores the spaces of Islamophobia in France and United Kingdom. 
Both countries report a large number of Muslim populations (Duncan, 2016) and a high 
rate of Islamophobic acts (Ray et al., 2014), but we focus on Paris and London because 
they are both ethnically and religiously diverse world cities and important European 
capitals. These two countries of study are also proritized because they present different 
political models: one fosters the republican equality among all its citizens (the French 
republican model), while the other recognizes the multicultural differences among all its 
inhabitants (the British multicultural model). These two models have a direct impact on 
the dynamics of Islamophobia observed in each country, and notably the spatial dynamics 
that we highlight in this contribution. This paper is part of a research project entitled 
SAMA (Spaces of Anti-Muslim Acts) funded by the European Commission. 
Islamophobia occurs in specific places and spaces, and its spatial distribution reflects 
specific urban patterns. Our intention is to identify not only the places of anti-Muslim 
acts (whether it is a public area, a public transport, or a public institution) in order to 
better understand the mechanisms of functioning of Islamophobia, but also the urban 
locations of where these acts occur (e.g. the centre, suburbs, or peripheral districts) by 
analysing geographical data that allow us to highlight the main spatial logics of 
Islamophobia. With this spatial analysis, we examine if the pattern describes a specific 
urban model (such as for example models2 borrowed from urban sociology: the centre-
periphery urban model, the model taking transport axes into account or the mosaic model 
that describes specific focal points referring mostly to deprived urban areas). Indeed, we 
                                                 
2 Initial research on spatial inequality was conducted in Chicago where three different well-known 
urban models were developed. The first model is the concentric model, which is also called 
the centre-periphery urban model (Burgess, 1925), contrasting the city centre with its suburbs. 
The second model is the sector model which takes into account the importance of the specific 
axes, and notably transport axes (Hoyt, 1939). And the third one is the multiple nuclei model 
(Harris and Ullman, 1945) that describes an urban structure in mosaic where focal points 
present a certain competition between primary and secondary centralities. 
will observe whether or not spaces of discrimination correspond or contrast with the 
situation in the suburbs where Muslim populations and places of worship are 
overwhelmingly located in the Parisian region (Vieillard-Baron, 2004) or with specific 
areas in the London region, like the boroughs of Tower Hamlets or Newham (Githens-
Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Naqshbandi, 2006). These areas could also reveal several 
oppositions or associations between different districts of the studied cities: rich or poor 
districts, Northern or Southern districts, well-considered or stigmatized districts, etc. 
 
Beyond this first spatial approach, we also consider the ways Islamophobia is 
shaped by its intersections with other markers of inequality such as gender, race, age and 
class. Our second approach to Islamophobia is rooted within feminist geographies of 
intersectionality (Rose, 1993; Kobayashi and Peake, 1994; Kofman et al., 2000; Kern and 
Mullins, 2013; Kobayashi, 2014; Hopkins, 2017; Najib and Hopkins, 2018). In recent 
decades, feminist geographers have considered issues of fear, place and the contested 
geographies of Muslim women began to incorporate gender, sexuality, race, religion, 
dress, etc. (Dwyer, 1999; Pain, 2010; Hancock, 2015; Listerborn, 2015; Teeple Hopkins, 
2015; Yorgason and Della Dora, 2009; Secor, 2002). People have a complex combination 
of identities and can be discriminated against due to these multiple identities or due to 
one in particular. Discrimination and hostility directed toward Islam can be explained by 
the fact that it is often interpreted as a public problem in Europe (Mamdani, 2002; 
Lorcerie, 2005; Cesari, 2009; Hajjat and Mohammed, 2013, Goody, 2013), but also 
especially by the fact that this religion holds within itself other sensitive indicators related 
to immigration, colonial past, oppression of women and concerns about being associate 
with terrorist dangers (Abu-Lughod, 2002 and 2006; Khiabany and Williamson, 2008; 
Hopkins, 2008 and 2009a; Staeheli and Nagel, 2008; Le Cour Grandmaison, 2010; 
Reynaud Paligot, 2011; Simon and Tiberj, 2013). These negative representations have 
contributed to increase in discrimination or violence against institutions or individuals 
because of their real or presumed affiliation with the Islamic faith. In this paper, we 
investigate and critically explore the characteristics of the victims of Islamophobia as well 
as the perpetrators. In so doing, we demonstrate that Islamophobic discrimination is 
connected to other types of intersecting discriminations such as sexism, racism, ageism 
and classism.  
Specifically, we focus on discrimination against individuals, and their socio-
demographic and ethnic criteria in order to better highlight these intersections. We show 
that Islam is a racialized religion, a point that scholars have situated from a historical 
perspective of Orientalist colonial tropes (Said, 1978; Le Cour Grandmaison, 2010; 
Reynaud Paligot, 2011). Islamophobia appears as a racialization process of individuals 
presumed to be Muslim; a process that essentialises a group of highly diverse individuals 
under one single religious attribute (Dunn et al., 2007; Naber, 2008; Allen, 2010; Sayyid 
and Vakil, 2010; Meer and Modood, 2010). Indeed, the Muslim community in both 
France and the UK is very diverse in terms of culture and ways of understanding and 
practicing the Islamic religion; which is why we use, throughout this paper, the term 
‘Muslim populations’ in the plural for describing the French and British contexts and for 
refuting the idea that Muslims represent a monolithic bloc (Kalin, 2001; Halliday, 2003). 
Sometimes even non-Muslims (such as Sikhs, Hindus, non-religious North Africans and 
South Asians or women who wear a veil due to illness or for fashion) are also victims of 
Islamophobia (Hyndman et al., 2010; Hopkins et al., 2017). This refers to a sociological 
dimension of Muslim identity (to appearances and representations) (Venel, 2004; 
Hancock, 2015) that we also have to take into account. Indeed, this kind of aestheticism 
and visibility of being Muslim or presumed to be Muslim are important when considering 
the issue of Islamophobia, and especially regarding women who wear the headscarf. 
Veiled women, as a result of their headcovering, their gender and their relations with 
public spaces, society, and state institutions (Gökariksel, 2009), become the centre of 
attention. Therefore, the aim is to consider the intersectionality of Islamophobia with 
other markers of social and cultural difference in the both cities, because Islamophobia 
can be shaped by other types of discrimination such as those related to gender, ethnic 
origin, age or socio-occupational status of the individual (Modood, 1997; Geisser, 2003; 
Fassin and Fassin, 2006; Listerborn, 2015). Indeed, these other discriminations do not 
possess any ‘acceptable’ justification, unlike Islamophobia which can appear from some 
perpetrators’ point of view as the simple criticism of a religion (CCIF, 2014). Research 
has found a correlation between hostility against Islam and the rejection of Muslim 
populations (Runnymede Trust, 1997; Meer and Modood, 2009; Bleich, 2011; Klug, 
2012). In this sense, the report on Islamophobia conducted by the Runnymede Trust 
(1997) explains that this hostility (or fear) is precisely based on stereotypes used to justify 
these discriminatory practices.      
 
The study, data and methods 
While most studies on Muslim exclusion rely on qualitative methodologies 
(Dwyer, 1999; Dunn, 2005; Hancock, 2015; Hopkins, 2009b; Githens-Mazer and 
Lambert, 2010; Mansson McGinty, 2012; Zempi and Chakraboti, 2015; Hopkins, 2016), 
we contribute a quantitative analysis of discrimination affecting Muslim populations or 
people who are perceived as Muslim. Indeed, there is a lack of research on Islamophobia 
that uses quantitative methods or mixed-methods approaches (Hopkins, 2009b). Peake 
(2009) has outlined the recent lack of quantitative research in gender studies. In our 
contribution, it is not about assessing or opposing quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Indeed, this research project uses both methods, because we think that it is important to 
first start with quantitative data in order to better understand the general context, and then 
to focus in on more qualitative specificities that figures cannot explain. Indeed, 
quantitative data can also reveal important findings on the process of functioning of 
Islamophobia. Specifically, the statistical work we present here allows us, on the one 
hand, to identify the geographical spaces where anti-Muslim acts took place in Paris and 
London, and on the other hand, to better describe the characteristics of the first victims 
and perpetrators. Our study of spaces of Islamophobia draws upon the collection of geo-
referenced and personal data from the main organisations that focus on identifying these 
acts. For the French case, it is the CCIF (Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France; the 
Collective against Islamophobia in France) which has, at the individual scale, a rich 
database because it takes all statements into account (after a verification of conforming 
material elements), unlike the Ministry of Interior which provides data that is difficult to 
collect and only considers acts that conclude with formal complaints. Concerning the 
British case, we refer to the findings of Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) 
because the organisation has produced a report entitled ‘Geography of anti-Muslim Hate 
in 2015’ in the UK. Regarding the city of London, we also refer to the Metropolitan Police 
data that the MEND association (Muslim Engagement and Development) provided to us. 
Consequently, our quantitative work is based on several databases and findings (CCIF, 
Metropolitan Police, Tell MAMA). The comparison between the two cities of London 
and Paris also represents an innovative contribution to the literature as there are few 
comparative studies of Islamophobia (Cesari, 2011).  
By analyzing recent data, we note for the French case that the CCIF recorded 905 
anti-Muslim acts in 2015 (CCIF, 2016), among which 43% were in the Île-de-France 
region (region of Paris). Thus, the region of Paris is the most affected region in France 
(followed by the region Auvergne/Rhône-Alpes which records 17% of Islamophobic acts, 
and then by the region Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur which records 8% of these acts). In 
Britain, Tell MAMA received 1128 reports of anti-Muslim acts in 2015. These acts are 
mainly concentrated in England, and in large urban areas where live in great majority the 
Muslim populations (Peach, 2006), such as Birmingham, Manchester and London where 
there is the majority of the geocoded data (Tell MAMA, 2016). But the Metropolitan 
Police recorded an impressive total of 1052 acts the same year only in London.  
For the two case studies, we analysed the most recent data available at the time of 
our investigation (data from 2015). The CCIF distinguishes between 65% of 
discrimination, 5% of verbal abuse, 6% of physical assault, 17% of discourse, and 7% of 
degradation and profanation. As for Tell MAMA, the organisation differentiates between 
offline acts from online acts (respectively 39% and 32%). Offline acts correspond to acts 
that happen in person between a victim and a perpetrator, while online acts are mainly 
those on social media platforms. Of these offline acts, there are 50% of verbal abuse, 17% 
of assault, 10% of vandalism and criminal damage, 7.5% of discrimination, 7.5% of 
threatening behaviour, 5% of anti-Muslim literature, and 3% of hate speech. For both 
cases, Islamophobic acts increase over time. In France, there is an increase of 18% 
between 2014 and 2015 (CCIF, 2016) and in Britain, there is a 200% increase in offline 
Islamophobic acts in 2015 (Tell MAMA, 2016). Therefore, it is important to understand 
that the year 2015 represents a specific year for both countries. Indeed, 2015 remains a 
difficult year for France with several terrorist attacks and the state of emergency, but also 
for the CCIF which had to face the highest rate of anti-Muslim acts since its existence. 
These terrorist attacks in France but also other high visibility events (such as for example 
the terrorist attacks in Tunisia which killed several British tourists) have a clear impact 
on anti-Muslim acts in the United Kingdom with increases in reported hate crimes. In 
addition to these high visibility events, Muslim people are usually portrayed as the 
ultimate ‘Others’ by political narratives and the media is one of the major contributing 
factors, which is often seen to cause discrimination between Muslim and non-Muslim 
populations (Ameli, 2004; Saeed, 2007; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010).     
   
Spaces and places of Islamophobia in Paris and London 
According to the acts recorded in France in 2015 by the CCIF, 64% of 
Islamophobic acts take place in public institutions (such as a town hall, a school or a 
hospital). Therefore, the main perpetrators of anti-Muslim hostility in France are public 
institutions. Some public service employees believe that they have the right to extend the 
scope of the 2004 French law (which bans the headscarf in public schools) to all the users 
of public services and institutions. Additional discriminations in Paris are from a legal 
entity (for example, through the boss of the victim or a colleague) and from an individual 
(who can be, for instance, a passerby on the street). The overwhelming majority of the 
discrimination takes place within an institutional or professional frame (98%), unlike in 
the United Kingdom where anti-Muslim acts primarily occur in public areas (in the street 
or in the park for example) and public transport (such as on the bus or a railway station), 
respectively 25% and 20% in 2015 (Tell MAMA, 2016). Spaces of Islamophobia in the 
UK rather refer to everyday spaces such as areas with a high pedestrian activity. These 
observations can lead us to question the different ways in which Islamophobia functions 
in each city. In France, we can undoubtedly read the impact of the 2004 French law and 
therefore a top-down descending process that would emanate firstly from the State and 
not from individuals themselves. On the contrary, in the UK, this phenomenon rather 
describes a bottom-up ascending process that would emanate primarily from individuals, 
under the influence of the media (Ameli, 2004; Saeed, 2007). That said, some researchers 
reveal nevertheless signs of institutional Islamophobia displayed by the British 
government (Nagel, 2002; Ansari and Karim, 2005; Poynting and Mason, 2007).  
In Paris, 35% of anti-Muslim acts occurred in the Parisian centre (i.e. the 
department of Paris, named Paris intra-muros), compared to 60% in the inner suburb3 
(named proche banlieue). But taken separately, we notice that Paris is the most affected 
department within the Greater Paris region (and even within the Île-de-France region4) as 
shown in the figure 1 revealing a difference of 13 to 17 points compared to the other 
departments. Departments of the inner suburb are slightly more affected than that of the 
outer suburb. Thus, anti-Muslim acts take place more in the Parisian centre, and they 
decrease progressively as we move away from the centre. Spaces of Islamophobia in Paris 
reflect a centre-periphery urban model opposing the city-centre and its suburbs, as we see 
in the Paris urban model in figure 2. This centre-periphery model usually describes the 
urban patterns of most European cities (because they are built from a medieval centre 
around which have developed peripheral belts and then suburban areas). From the 2012 
population census of INSEE5, the poorer classes are mostly relegated to enclaved and 
marginalized areas located in the suburbs, while the privileged classes are enjoying the 
dynamism of the centre and its various metropolitan functions. However, people living in 
the suburbs are strongly attracted to the central town, but we can see for the Muslim 
                                                 
3 The inner suburb is made up by the three departments of Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis and 
Val-de-Marne, and form with Paris intra-muros what we call the Greater Paris region.  
4 As for the Île-de-France region, it consists the Greater Paris region and the outer suburb, which 
comprises the four departments of Seine-et-Marne, Yvelines, Essonne and Val-d’Oise. 
5 The National Institute of Economic Studies (Institut National des Etudes Economiques) which 
conducts the census of the population in France.  
populations that they seem excluded from the centre not only because of their social class 
but also because of their religious appearance, which can allow them to be a more visible 
target for potential Islamophobic acts. Finally, the relationships between a prestigious 
centre and suburbs that are more deprived are more obvious and readable.  
 
 
Figure 1. Anti-Muslim acts in the Greater Paris region (CCIF)  
 
 























As for the London case, there are as many anti-Muslim acts in inner London as 
there is in suburban London (that is to say, respectively 50.3% and 49.7% according to 
the Metropolitan Police data). Unlike in Paris, the importance of some main horizontal 
and vertical lines is shown by the corresponding urban model. Indeed, in the Greater 
London region, anti-Muslim acts occur mainly in everyday places, that is to say in public 
areas and public transport (Tell MAMA, 2016). The phenomenon seems to be more 
spatially diffuse than in Paris, and seems to extend mainly along the major roads. 
Therefore, the spatial pattern of Islamophobia in London rather describes a model which 
takes into account the important role of transport axes in its configuration.  
Islamophobia in Paris 
When focusing on the twenty arrondissements (districts) of central Paris, every 
area has recorded Islamophobic acts. But at this scale of Paris intra-muros, there is no 
clear asymmetry, no North/South, East/West or centre/periphery asymmetry (Najib, in 
press), unlike at the Greater Paris scale (or even at the Île-de-France scale) where we 
know that Paris is the most affected department. We found that the 17th, 12th and 14th 
arrondissements record the highest number of anti-Muslim acts (respectively 6, 7 and 10 
acts) (appendix 1). This last number of 10 acts is primarily due to one Islamophobic 
situation that happened in work contexts which has affected five different people, all of 
whom have reported their experience. Beyond this Parisian centre, all of the cities of the 
department of Hauts-de-Seine (located in the west of the Greater Paris region) are affected 
by Islamophobia. Even if the total number of Islamophobic acts is lower than other 
departments, 70% of the cities located in this department record at least one Islamophobic 
act. This department of Hauts-de-Seine represents a wealthy area where there is a low 
rate of unemployed people, manual labourers, immigrants (according to the 2012 
population census of INSEE).  
More than 50% of municipalities located in the departments of Seine-Saint-Denis 
and Val-de-Marne record no Islamophobic acts (they appear in grey in the map of figure 
2). Within Paris intra-muros, the second arrondissement records only one act, but we 
found that the number of anti-Muslim acts is not important in popular arrondissements 
such as the 18th, 19th and 20th arrondissements. In this sense, we know (as the next section 
on intersectionality will show in-depth) that Muslim populations in France usually refer 
to immigrant, working class and disadvantaged families (Vieillard-Baron, 2004; Le Cour 
Grandmaison, 2010; Reynaud Paligot, 2011; Simon and Tiberj, 2013, Hajjat and 
Mohammed, 2013). Therefore, an important question is about the extent to which spaces 
where anti-Muslim acts take place correspond or contrast with spaces where Muslim 
populations live in great majority. This question is difficult to answer for the French case 
because data on race and religion are not available in France. The lack of statistical 
information in these areas poses challenges of analyzing important issues such as 
Islamophobia without data about race or religion to hand. That said, we know that only 
11% of anti-Muslim acts (when we have the precise location) took place in ‘troubled 
urban areas’ (named ZUS, Zones Urbaines Sensibles) referring to spaces of poverty and 
degradation, and where Muslim populations seem to live in great majority (Najib, in 
press). Indeed, this information can only be cautiously considered because of the non-
availability of the data, but most researchers have already demonstrated this connection 
(Vieillard-Baron, 2004; Laurence and Vaïsse, 2007; Simon and Tiberj, 2013; Adraoui, 
2013). Thus, the majority of anti-Muslim acts are observed in areas not classified by the 
Town Policy. 
That said, there are focal points located in the Northeast of the greater Paris region 
in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis which records the highest number of ZUS in the 
whole of France (CIV, 2010; Chevalier, 2010). In this area, anti-Muslim acts occurred 
mostly in the cities of Saint-Denis and Aubervilliers, and to a lesser degree in Aulnay-
sous-Bois. These municipalities reveal ‘pockets’ of segregation where Islamophobic acts 
are important. Besides, there are also other isolated and scattered focal points in the South 
of the Greater Paris in the cities of Créteil and Orly. In Créteil, which is an important 
administrative and academic municipality, there were 8 anti-Muslim acts that occurred 
mostly in public institutions (such as education and training institutes, hospitals, etc). As 
for Orly, all the 5 anti-Muslim acts are related to the airport.   
Spaces of Islamophobia generally contrast with spaces where Muslim populations 
and places of worship are overwhelmingly located (in the suburb and in ZUS) (Najib, in 
press). This observation highlights geographical tensions (Göle, 2003) which reflects – 
in line with Listerborn’s findings (2015) – some opposition or contradiction between 
spaces generally well considered and socially valued but where the victims could feel 
vulnerable, with spaces generally stigmatized and feared by the majority but where these 
populations could feel comfortable. In Paris, Islamophobia describes a clear centre-
periphery opposition with some focal points referring to either institutional areas or some 
deprived areas. 
 
Islamophobia in London  
As far as the Greater London region is concerned, we observe that generally 
boroughs located in the north of the Thames are more affected than those located in the 
south. There is also an important horizontal line in dark red in the map of figure 2 showing 
a worrying level of Islamophobic acts. This line is located just north of the Thames from 
Newham to Hounslow boroughs (appendix 2) and refers to one of the major roads in 
London. According to Tell MAMA (2016), we know that anti-Muslim acts occur, in great 
majority, in areas with good transport links and a high pedestrian activity.  
In inner London, the main clusters are in the east but also in the west. The first 
cluster in the east consists the boroughs of Newham, Tower Hamlets, Hackney, and 
Islington (in dark red) where there are several mosques and Islamic centres. This area is 
affected because there are important Muslim populations and Islamic institutions that 
have been frequently targeted by Islamophobic acts. Tell MAMA (2016) has 
demonstrated that there is a direct relationship between the number of mosques in an area 
and the number of Islamophobic acts, unlike in the Parisian region where anti-Muslim 
acts mainly take place in public institutions. A second important cluster is observed in the 
west, in the wealthiest part of London that is to say the boroughs of Hammersmith & 
Fulham and Westmister which record an important level of anti-Muslim acts (respectively 
45 and 62 acts). These acts generally occurred around major shopping and tourist areas, 
busy streets and areas with public transit access (Tell MAMA, 2016). These two clusters 
form a line that extends in the west to outer London, to the three boroughs of Brent, Ealing 
and Hounslow (Hounslow which represents the most affected borough with a total of 68 
anti-Muslim acts). This ‘line’ (from Hounslow to Central London) crosses residential 
areas where Muslim populations live in majority, and reflect their probability to be 
attacked when they use public transports to go to Central London for example.    
In the suburbs of London, there is a cluster located in the northeast, in the 
boroughs of Waltham Forest and Redbridge, where there are also mosques. A second line, 
a vertical one, can be observed from this cluster located in the northeast of the Greater 
London region to the borough of Croydon located in the South. Incidents in the South 
London are also important and notably in the boroughs of Lambeth, Southwark and 
Lewisham, and they concern areas that attract many individuals for commuting, work, 
leisure and shopping (Tell MAMA, 2016). With this analysis on different parts of 
London, there is no significant relationship between the proportion of Muslim 
populations in an area and the likelihood of anti-Muslim acts (although, at the scale of 
the whole city, this relationship seems more relevant) (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; 
Tell MAMA, 2016). As is the case with Paris, spaces of Islamophobia do not necessarily 
occur where Muslim populations live (in link with the data of the 2011 census of the 
Office for National Statistics, ONS).  
 
Intersectionality of Islamophobia in Paris and London 
From the CCIF’s data in 2015, we know that in the Greater Paris area, anti-Muslim 
acts primarily affect women and in particular veiled women. Women are 81% of the 
victims, among which at least 85% were veiled women (whether it is mostly a hijab 
(81%), or less commonly a jilbeb (8%), a turban (5%), a simple bandana (3%) or a niqab 
(3%)). At the scale of the French nation, physical assaults mostly affect women (82%) 
and veiled women (at least 80%). The place of the veiled women became a problem in 
France when her social integration became visible, that is to say when we started to see 
her at school, university, and in the labour market. In this context, the body and the outfit 
of women occupy a central place in policies of integration and in particular in the 
construction of citizenship and national identity (Scott, 2007; Fernando, 2009). In the 
UK, women are also the first victims: they represent, in 2015, 61% of the victims, among 
which 75% were visibly Muslim women, that is to say women wearing Islamic clothes, 
such as a hijab (77%), a niqab (13%) or an abaya (Tell MAMA, 2016). They are, just as 
in France, very affected by abusive behaviors (62%), and most of the time, perpetrators 
use misogynistic and sexualized language towards these women (ibid.). Therefore, 
Islamophobia is highly gendered since women are more targeted than men. Women are 
more affected because they are at the same time more visible targets (by wearing a 
headscarf) and more fragile targets (when they are alone for example). Often in France, 
the UK, and in other non-Muslim countries, dominant public discourse often associates 
the wearing of the veil with negative representations of women’s submission, gender 
inequality, lack of integration and modernity, and religious extremism (Guénif-Souilamas 
and Macé, 2004; Staeheli and Nagel, 2008; Hancock, 2009; Moors, 2009). Although these 
types of drifts exist in various parts of the world, it is necessary to hear the voice of these 
‘French’ and ‘British’ veiled women and understand that, for the majority of them, this is 
an individual choice which is a matter of a personal spiritual journey and a desire to fully 
decide how to present their own body. Finally, it is complicated for Muslim women to be 
seen as complete women and feminists because they are systematically referred to as the 
embodiement of ‘failed integration’, especially in France, while on the contrary the 
Muslim woman who decides not to wear the veil is assimilated to a successful integration 
(Fernando, 2009; Listerborn, 2015). They are seen either as submissive to Muslim men 
or either as saved by non-Muslims. In any case, whether it is the male domination or the 
western paternalistic vision (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; Okin, 1999), the assumption is 
often that Muslim women (veiled or not) have no agency to make their own decisions and 
analyze themselves over time.  
In France, students are often affected by anti-Muslim discriminations. In the 
Greater Paris, they represent 32% of the victims in 2015, among which 15% were more 
at school. High school students in France are in great majority under 18 years old, and 
the average age for the French students is 21.5 years old in 2011 (OVE, 2011), the 
youngest age compared to ten other European countries. Thus, Islamophobia seems to 
affect younger people (Ramberg, 2005) more than older people. Older people who 
practice the Islamic religion, likely to be foreigners or immigrants, are less subject to 
Islamophobia because their practices often refer to traditional customs of their country of 
origin, unlike the youngest who can live in France and in the UK and experience a real 
religious revivalism (Cesari, 1998; Abbas, 2005; Poynting and Mason, 2007; Hamid, 
2011; Simon et Tiberj, 2013;), sometimes in connection with their experiences of 
discriminations (Poynting and Mason, 2007; Phalet et al., 2008). Finally, young Muslims, 
who have grown up in France and UK and who ask for access to the same rights as 
everyone, feel more excluded when they wear a sign of belonging to the Islamic religion. 
By choosing to wear a veil or a beard for example (or any other sign), they can be denied 
access to education and freedom symbolically offered to them, in comparison with their 
parents. And in response to this exclusion, some young Muslims (Liogier, 2012) react by 
creating new modes of ethical and political engagement (Jonker and Amiraux, 2006; 
Fernando, 2014; Finlay et al., 2017). 
As for the socio-occupational category of the victims, there is a high proportion 
of victims referring to the category ‘other’ in Paris. They are 34% and can correspond to 
either housewives or no-answers. Employees represent 18% of the victims, and 
unemployed people 6%. And there is only one victim referring to the category of 
‘executives and intellectual professionals’. For the British context, Tell MAMA (2016) 
does not show detailed information on the socio-occupational category of the victims, but 
it explains that 7% of anti-Muslim acts occur in the workplace. And victims who work in 
customer service are particularly vulnerable to anti-Muslim incidents. This question of 
social class is important because it describes the socio-economic profile of Muslim 
populations living in France and UK who experience discrimination. It is clear that these 
populations are rather precarious (in comparison with other countries such as the United 
States where they are more part of the upper-middle class and are rarely referred to the 
inhabitants of poor districts kept in the margins of the society (Marzouki, 2017)). Muslim 
populations in France and UK mostly describe populations in difficulty; but does this 
have an impact on the extent of Islamophobia? Is it more or less strong according to the 
social status? The study of this correlation is not easy, but this difference could doubtless 
be observed (thanks to a more qualitative approach; hence the importance of a 
combination of the various methods) in France and UK with the example of veiled women 
and their occupation of rich or poor spaces in Paris and London. Due to their limited and 
restricted mobility, veiled women feel safer in familiar spaces (i.e. their own 
neighborhood) (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Zempi and Chakraboti, 2015). For 
example in Paris, Muslim women pass unnoticed in some luxurious areas, such as the 
famous Avenue of the Champs Elysées compared to other spaces because they are 
assumed to be wealthy people from Saudi Arabia or Dubai for example (Najib and 
Hopkins, 2018). Here, it can be noticed that the hijab of rich foreigners and the hijab of 
French Muslim citizens have varying impacts on discrimination: there is less hostility 
toward Muslim women perceived as upper-class international tourists than as working-
class French Muslim women.  
Finally, concerning the ethnic origin of the victims, the CCIF does not have any 
detailed data on this issue compared to Tell MAMA. In Paris, 89% of the victims are 
Muslim-born men and women, compared to 9% who declare themselves converted to 
Islam. Moreover, we know that French Muslim populations are largely a result of 
immigration from the Glorious Thirty Years6 (Simon and Tiberj, 2013). These Muslim-
born men and women are either foreigners or French citizens with a foreign background 
from countries located in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa or Turkey. Thus, Muslim 
populations who are discriminated against according to their religious affiliation can also 
                                                 
6 This refers, in France, to the prosperous period from 1945 to 1975 (called in French ‘Les Trente 
Glorieuses’).  
be discriminated against because of their ethnic origin. In this sense, several CCIF reports 
explain that a certain number of Islamophobic acts and discourses refer to the foreign 
origin of the victims, and in particular to their Arabic background (CCIF, 2011, 2012, 
2015). Therefore, we can assume that people with Arabic or North African origin are 
more affected than others. We were able to verify this by identifying the origin of the 
victims with their name. Even if this information does not necessarily correspond to the 
real ethnic origin of the individuals, we can nevertheless notice that 81% of the victims 
have an Arabic-sounding name, compared to 10% who have a French or European 
sounding name and 6% from Sub-Saharan Africa (the rest corresponding to files with no 
name or with names difficult to identify). For the British case, anti-Muslim acts are also 
accompanied by insults referring to the ethnic origin of the individuals. Indeed, 60% of 
the victims are South Asians. They represent the first victims, following by victims who 
are Arabs or North Africans (13%), Whites (12%), and Blacks (6%)7 (Tell MAMA, 
2016). The proportion of South Asians is much higher in the UK than it is in France, as 
well as the proportion of North Africans is much lower in the UK than it is in France. But 
what it is clear is the fact that Islamophobia focuses on and targets one of the most 
stigmatized minorities of each country, notably the minority who is related to the colonial 
past of each country. The racialization of Islamophobia therefore refers to existing 
relations with former colonial empires that are France and United Kingdom (Hancock, 
                                                 
7 Surprisingly, these percentages correspond to the percentages of the different Muslim 
populations in England and Wales in 2001 according to the Ceri Peach’s article (2006). He 
specifies that there are 67.8% of South Asian Muslims, 11.6% of White Muslims, 6.9% of 
Black Muslims.   
 
2009). This is also the case with white converts. Indeed, when a white woman with a 
French or British origin converts to Islam and decides to wear the veil, she is also assumed 
to be from a foreign background. She becomes racialized; the attackers can tell her to go 
back to her country while she is from France or the UK. In this sense, Ahmed (2000) 
explains that an individual become a stranger when we begin to recognize him or her as 
a stranger and when he or she begins to feel stranger. Thus, it is common for some 
converted women to feel foreign and to distance themselves from the majority population, 
especially after having decided to wear the veil.   
Consequently, it is possible to portray the typical profile of the victim for both 
studied areas. The contexts of Paris and London present almost similar findings in terms 
of victims’ characteristics. It is about women, and particularly veiled women with foreign 
backgrounds and low social class. They can be either students and young people or 
shoppers and customers. The intersectionality of Islamophobia describes a general 
domination already known in our contemporary societies related to sexism, racism, 
ageism and classism. The main victims refer to marginalised people because Muslim 
populations in France and UK usually refer to immigration, working class and poor areas 
(Vieillard-Baron, 2004; Laurence and Vaïsse, 2007; Simon et Tiberj, 2013; Stephen and 
Khan, 2013; Ali, 2015). In addition, this typical profile of the victim mirrors the typical 
profile of the discriminator, as depicted in the report on anti-Muslim hate crimes in the 
UK (Copsey et al., 2013) – a British white man between 25 to 59 years old. This finding 
is exactly the same as found in the Tell MAMA’s report (2016), with exception of some 
teenagers between 13 to 18 years old who are also very active. That said, for the French 
case, the CCIF in its report of 2010 explained that perpetrators are generally more than 
25 years of age and half the time a woman (CCIF, 2011); which is also what the data of 
2015 show for Paris. As far as the information is available, there are as much women 
(42%) as men (42%) in Paris in 2015. Finally, with this question of the typical profile of 
the perpetrator, Islamophobia works as a male domination (because we can see men 
attacking women, and very often women in situations of fragility, that is to say when they 
are alone or accompanied by their young children (CCIF, 2014, Listerborn, 2015); or 
conversely as a feminist double standard (because we can see women attacking other 
women in the name of women’s emancipation).   
 
Conclusion: two different Islamophobias? 
This comparative analysis of Islamophobia in Paris and London is relevant 
because it reveals the specificities of each country despite their shared European context. 
The two cities highlight more differences than similarities, in connection with their own 
political, social, urban and racial context. These are summarised in the table below:   
 France, Paris UK, London Comparison 
Spaces 
Mostly in the Parisian centre 
than in the suburbs 
Areas with important 
transport axes and a high 
public transit access 
≠ 
Places Public institutions 
Public transport and public 
areas 
≠ 
Urban model Centre-periphery model 





Not necessarily where 
Muslim populations live: 
Opposition between spaces 
(well considered versus ZUS). 
Not necessarily where 
Muslim populations live: 
The phenomenon is more 
diffuse.  
= and ≠ 
Table 1. Two different Islamophobia in France (Paris) and UK (London)  
 
The table above simplifies the general findings and does not seek to impose a 
single vision of the phenomenon of Islamophobia that exists in France and in the UK. 
This table must be read as a summary of the two contexts and as a tool to see the 
similarities and differences between the two contexts. First, we know that in Paris, the 
spatial patterning of anti-Muslim acts describes a centre-periphery urban model, unlike 
in London where the phenomenon seems spatially more diffuse and more focused along 
transport axes. Thus, the urban models are different from one country to another. We also 
know that anti-Muslim acts are numerous around mosques and Muslim institutions in 
London, unlike in Paris where we do not observe a relationship between the number of 
mosques in an area and the number of Islamophobic acts. In the Greater Paris region, less 
than 2% of Islamophobic acts happen in Muslim institutions. However, in both contexts, 
anti-Muslim acts are not necessarily significant in districts where Muslim populations are 
Not around mosques and 
Muslim institutions 
Rather around mosques and 
Muslim institutions. 
Perpetrators Men and women Mostly men ≠ 
Victims 
Veiled women, with an 
Arabic background 
Veiled women, with a South 
Asian background 
= and ≠ 
State model Republican equality Multicultural model ≠ 
Functioning 
From the State: Impact of the 
2004 law (headscarf ban) 
From individuals: Contact 
with different communities 
≠ 
Consequences 
Muslims are worried about 
their mobility and French 
policy.  
Muslims are worried about 
their mobility and daily 
lives 
= and ≠ 
present (even if we have noticed some focal points). Indeed, the scale of the district of 
residence is known to be a place that foster encounters and exchanges (Ahmed, 2000; 
Hopkins, 2014). These zones of contact probably prevent the multiplication of anti-
Muslim acts. Therefore, we can observe a disjuncture between the political elite and the 
media that usually portray Islam and its followers in a negative way; and the people on 
the ground who know, often very well, the Muslim populations, that is to say who have 
grown up with them, studied with them, worked with them, and interacted on a daily basis 
with them. The French republican model bases its principles precisely on this social mix. 
This is probably why we observe in France less anti-Muslim acts in public areas, unlike 
the United Kingdom whose multicultural model promotes diversity in multiple forms and 
does not necessarily favor the intermingling of different communities. Finally, the zones 
of contact, in the British context, may be subject to more violence when the different 
communities meet; hence the observation of a higher rate of Islamophobic acts and a more 
general zone of contact which refers to spaces with a high pedestrian presence such as 
public areas and transport hubs. In this sense, these two models present at the same time 
advantages and disadvantages; first the British model recognizes and respects the 
plurality of ethnic-religious identities as well as the proud manifestation and visibility of 
their practices in the public space (unlike the French case which denies such differences); 
the French model promotes the mixing and the sharing between the various populations. 
In France, the impact of the 2004 law banning the headscarf in public schools is also 
strong and leads to see more victims among students and in public institutions. Therefore, 
Islamophobia in France seems to be more institutionalized (as Simon (2006) has 
observed, but for all other forms of discrimination), unlike in the UK where it seems to 
come more from the individuals themselves. Indeed, in the UK the victims are rather 
shoppers and customers, and Islamophobia occurs in the spaces of everyday life. Also, 
the victims are more likely to be of South Asian ethnic background in the UK and from a 
North-African background in France. In the UK, they are mostly men, unlike in France 
where they are as many men as women. Some specific French feminists tend to resist the 
veil, and argue that a veiled woman cannot be a feminist (Scott, 2007; Fernando, 2009). 
They usually agree with the headscarf ban, while in the UK, it seems rather a matter of 
male domination and control in public spaces.   
Although there are a lot of differences, there are some similarities: spaces of 
Islamophobia do not necessarily occur where Muslim populations live; the first victims 
are veiled and racially minoritised women; and Muslims in both countries are worried 
about their spatial mobility. This issue of mobility raises many important questions 
related to the spatial and behavioural practices and strategies developed and adopted by 
the main victims (Najib and Hopkins, 2018). Indeed, as previously demonstrated, 
geographical tensions describe important oppositions and contradictions, but they can 
also highlight new specific mobility and behaviours of veiled women. For instance, it is 
already known that veiled women (Perry, 2013; CCIF, 2014; Listerborn, 2015) usually 
avoid visiting certain areas particularly in privileged, shopping and central districts at 
certain times (CCIF, 2011; OSF, 2011; Hancock, 2013; Tell MAMA, 2016). Knowing 
that experiences of oppression restrict mobility (Rose, 1993), we can understand that 
these women avoid the spaces where they have already experienced a situation of 
discrimination, and they eventually develop new spatial strategies such as major detours 
or the use of specific means of transport (Listerborn, 2015). Thus, we can question if there 
are no-go areas for these women, as Tell MAMA (2016) suggests as well as if a geography 
of Islamophobia corresponds or contrasts with geographies of segregation and exclusion 
(Najib, in press). Hierarchies of feelings can compete and drive the discriminated 
individual to feel more connected to one area rather than another, and especially to their 
neighborhood or their city rather than their country (Koefoed and Simonsen, 2010; 
Lorcerie and Geisser, 2011; Millington, 2011). 
Finally, the findings steming from these large scale comparative data allow us to 
better understand each context of study and the relationships between places, identities, 
social hierarchies and racialized histories of both countries. When comparing France and 
the UK by taking into account the political, social, historical, spatial and national context 
of each country, we can better target the problem, make stronger claims and develop 
adequate actions to reduce Islamophobia. For example, the data show that the majority of 
anti-Muslim acts are discriminations and happen in public institutions in France. The 
French policy, notably the 2004 law could be said to foster such specific institutionalized 
discriminations. Training could be provided to service public employees in order to better 
understand that this law does not concern the users of public services. As for the UK, 
Islamophobic acts are mainly verbal abuses and occur mostly on public transport. The 
local transport companies could promote hate crime policies by displaying for example 
posters or CCTV dissuading such abusive acts. A geographical view on the study of 
Islamophobia enables us to demonstrate that space makes visible important differences, 
associations, contradictions, attractions and repulsions in relation to anti-Muslim acts 
(Clayton, 2009; Hancock, 2015).  
 Ultimately, these discriminations send a very clear message; the people concerned 
are not tolerated, they are seen to dress badly, and they should not be here. Anti-Muslim 
discrimination only serves to marginalize Muslim populations and has the effect of 
reaffirming their unacceptable difference (Scott, 2007). Thus, it is important to 
understand what it means to be a Muslim in France and the United Kingdom and what 
place is granted to Muslim populations in these two important European countries; we 
need to understand why this minority is perceived as a threat to urban order and to 
European culture (Law et al., 2004; Hancock, 2009; Moors, 2009; Githens-Mazer and 
Lambert, 2010 ; Liogier, 2012; Listerborn, 2015) if we are to eliminate Islamophobia. 
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